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Community of Interest Methodology  
and Public Testimony 
Karin Mac Donald* and Bruce E. Cain** 
In an effort to insulate the redistricting process from legislative 
influence, California’s voters approved Propositions 11 and 20, giving the 
Independent Citizen Commission the task of drawing the district 
boundaries for the Congress, the State Assembly, the State Senate, and 
Board of Equalization. The California Citizens Redistricting 
Commission proactively sought public input, asking Californians to tell 
them about the economic and social interests that bound their community 
together, where their community was located, and why it should be kept 
together in the interest of fair and effective representation. The language of 
article XXI, section 2 of the California Constitution was explicit with 
respect to the priority of neutral criteria: respect for the “geographic 
integrity” of any “local neighborhood” or “local community of interest” as 
well as city and county borders was listed fourth, right after the federal 
criteria of equal population, Voting Rights Act compliance, and 
geographic continuity. This Article evaluates the value of this approach 
and makes recommendations to improve the ways in which public input is 
solicited and utilized in the redistricting process. The central arguments are 
that: (1) purely quantitative and objective data approaches cannot 
substitute for qualitative testimony, (2) the amount of public input can be 
staggering and requires considerable efforts to process, and (3) community 
of interest considerations still have to be traded off with other redistricting 
criteria. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The novelties of any redistricting cycle can take many forms—shifts in 
judicial doctrine,1 evolving political conditions,2 technical refinements,3 or 
institutional innovations.4 Sometimes what seems new is actually old, only 
repackaged or embedded in a different political or institutional context. In the 
2011 redistricting cycle, traditional formal criteria—such as respect for local 
community boundaries, compactness, and community of interest considerations—
gained new prominence as a consequence of two important institutional 
developments: the evolution of increasingly independent redistricting 
commissions (IRCs) and the expanding role of public testimony. 
The connection between these two developments and the new emphasis on 
communities of interest (COIs) and public testimony is not merely coincidental. 
 
1. Given the Supreme Court’s reputation for following precedent, it is remarkable that the 
various phases of modern American redistricting are more marked by sharp shifts in judicial doctrine 
than any sudden change in political conditions. Court decisions have dictated the frequency of 
redistricting, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 197–98 (1962), the permissible structure of state 
bicameralism, Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964), and the standards for determining racial 
discriminatory effects, Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 58–61 (1986). Sometimes the Court’s 
decisions have cut off trends, as in the Shaw line of cases. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 630–31 (1993) 
(holding that electoral redistricting based on race must pass strict scrutiny); see also Hunt v. Cromartie, 
526 U.S. 541, 541–42 (1999) (holding that there was insufficient evidence of racial motive behind 
North Carolina’s congressional redistricting plan for the district court to have granted summary 
judgment); Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74 (1997) (finding that Georgia redistricting plan did not 
violate the Equal Protection Clause); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 954–55 (1996) (holding that a Texas 
redistricting plan failed strict scrutiny); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 
900, 900–02 (1995) (applying the Court’s holding in Shaw to find a redistricting policy in Georgia 
unconstitutional). We covered the historical phases of redistricting trends in Bruce E. Cain, Karin 
Mac Donald & Michael McDonald, From the Last Generation of Reform to the Next, in DEMOCRACY IN 
THE STATES: EXPERIMENTS IN ELECTION REFORM 199, 199–209 (Bruce E. Cain, Todd Donovan & 
Caroline Tolbert eds., 2008). 
2. Bipartisan gerrymanders were regarded more favorably in the less partisan 1970s than they 
have become in the current period of high polarization and frequent divided government. For an 
example of how courts viewed gerrymandering in state legislative districts during the less partisan era, 
see Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 752–54 (1973). 
3. See Micah Altman, Karin Mac Donald & Michael McDonald, From Crayons to Computers: The 
Evolution of Computer Use in Redistricting, 23 SOC. SCI. COMPUTER REV. 334, 335 (2005). 
4. See Bruce E. Cain, Redistricting Commissions: A Better Political Buffer?, 121 YALE L.J. 1808, 
1812–13 (2012) (analyzing the effectiveness of independent redistricting commissions as institutional 
reform). 
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The central premise of the IRC model is that incumbent influence over the 
redrawing of district lines is an inherent conflict of interest that must be 
eliminated to the greatest degree possible in order to achieve a fair and neutral 
process.5 Given that a finite number of commission members cannot possibly 
reflect all the nuanced, varied interests that arise in a large state redistricting, public 
input is critical to providing line-drawing guidance. In particular, the California 
Citizens Redistricting Commission (CRC, or the Commission), took unprece-
dented steps to become publicly transparent and to solicit residents’ written and 
in-person testimony.6 While their efforts were largely well received, a few critics 
have raised questions about the CRC approach. Some allege that the testimony 
that the CRC heard was stacked by a coordinated political effort and biased 
towards liberal and Democratic interests.7 Others have argued that objective 
approaches to determining community of interest should be given more play.8 
In the following sections of this Article, we will assess the role of public 
testimony and COI approaches to make three points. First, purely quantitative 
measures of community of interest cannot supplant qualitative public testimony. 
Aside from the various problems associated with creating accurate measures and 
turning them into quantitative standards, public testimony gives a better snapshot 
of what matters to voters, residents, and communities at a given time and place. If 
the goal is to reflect public interests and not merely to constrain line drawing in 
some seemingly neutral manner, public testimony is critical. Second, public 
testimony can easily overwhelm the redistricting process and sometimes provides 
conflicting interpretations. A sincere and earnest effort to determine the public’s 
interests in redistricting requires finding ways to process large amounts of 
information rapidly, examining the feasibility of competing proposals, and 
managing public expectations about the ability to satisfy everyone’s demands. 
Lastly, community of interest considerations, however they are determined, must 
be traded off with other criteria. The more specific the ordering of criteria set out 
in state constitutions and laws, the easier the guidelines for commissioners to 
follow. 
 
5. Id. at 1817–21. 
6. Id. at 1826–27. 
7. See Olga Pierce & Jeff Larson, How Democrats Fooled California’s Redistricting Commission, 
PROPUBLICA (Dec. 21, 2011), http://www.propublica.org/article/how-democrats-fooled-californias-
redistricting-commission. 
8. The foremost proponent of this is Nicholas Stephanopoulos, who has argued for objective 
community of interest standards in a trilogy of articles. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Communities 
and the California Commission, 23 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 281, 284–89 (2012) [hereinafter 
Stephanopoulos, Communities and the California Commission]; Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Redistricting 
and the Territorial Community, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1379, 1385–86 (2012) [hereinafter Stephanopoulos, 
Redistricting and the Territorial Community]; Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Spatial Diversity, 125 HARV. L. 
REV. 1903, 1949 n.217 (2012). 
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I. OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE APPROACHES TO COMMUNITIES OF INTEREST 
Redistricting standards fall into two basic types: (1) formal criteria focuses 
largely on the shape, size, racial, and socioeconomic composition of the districts 
and (2) fairness outcome measures such as proportionality and seats-vote 
symmetry.9 The case for formal criteria has always been made on two levels: their 
intrinsic worth and their indirect value in constraining efforts to draw lines that 
intentionally and unfairly favor one party or group over others. Some formal 
criteria are easily measured and relatively uncontroversial—for example, that 
district boundaries must be contiguous (connected at all points) and have equal 
populations.10 By comparison, COI considerations—the expectation that districts 
be composed of “cognizable” common interests—are harder to identify a priori 
because there is a subjective component to the interests and boundaries of a given 
COI. The “interest” in a COI is not merely a clustering of some measurable social 
or economic characteristic. Residents in that area have to perceive and 
acknowledge that a social, cultural, or economic interest is politically relevant. COI 
geography is ultimately subjective as well. The boundaries of an interest 
“community” do not usually coincide neatly with government jurisdictions or 
follow fixed, uniform patterns. Even advocates of better quantitative COI 
measures concede that perception matters with respect to identifying COIs.11 
A. Communities of Interest 
The idea that communities of interest matter in a good redistricting process 
is certainly not novel. COIs have been part of the mix in scholarly redistricting 
discussions for decades.12 COIs are recognized in five state constitutions and 
seven other state statutes.13 COIs have also long been important in local 
government redistricting.14 In California, COI was specifically mentioned in the 
Master’s reports in 1973 and 1991: 
 
9. There was a vigorous debate over the merits of formal criteria in the 1980s. See, e.g., Bruce 
E. Cain, Simple vs. Complex Criteria for Partisan Gerrymandering: A Comment on Niemi and Grofman, 33 
UCLA L. REV. 213, 214–16 (1985); Bernard Grofman, Criteria for Districting: A Social Science Perspective, 
33 UCLA L. REV. 77, 79–93 (1985); Daniel H. Lowenstein & Jonathan Steinberg, The Quest for 
Legislative Districting in the Public Interest: Elusive or Illusory?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1, 12–35 (1985). 
10. Although there has been a vigorous debate over using adjusted versus unadjusted census 
data for several decades, the major population-related issue in the last two redistricting cycles centered 
more on whether to use VAP or CVAP numbers when accounting for minority populations under 
the VRA. Nathaniel Persily, The Law of the Census: How to Count, What to Count, Whom to Count, and 
Where to Count Them, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 755, 778 (2011). 
11. Stephanopoulos acknowledges that territorial communities have a “third element, a feeling 
of communal affiliation” that is “subjective in nature.” Stephanopoulos, Redistricting and the Territorial 
Community, supra note 8, at 1430. 
12. An early proponent of this approach was geographer Richard Morrill. See, e.g., Richard L. 
Morrill, Redistricting, Region and Representation, 6 POL. GEOGRAPHY Q. 241, 251–53 (1987). 
13. Stephanopoulos, Redistricting and the Territorial Community, supra note 8, at 1424–25. 
14. See Bruce E. Cain & David A. Hopkins, Mapmaking at the Grassroots: The Legal and Political 
Issues of Local Redistricting, 1 ELECTION L.J. 515, 527–29 (2002). 
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[S]ocial and economic interests common to the population of an area 
which are probable subjects of legislative action . . . should be considered 
in determining whether the area should be included within or excluded 
from a proposed district in order that all of the citizens of the district 
might be represented reasonably, fairly and effectively.15 
The Masters wording reveals very clearly that community of interest has 
always been a territorial concept (i.e., a defined area with certain common 
economic, social, or cultural interests).16 
The rationale for COI-based districts derives implicitly from a delegate view 
of representation. In the delegate conception, the representative’s job is to 
advocate for the majority interests and preferences of constituents residing within 
the boundaries of a given district or territorial jurisdiction. In the trustee version, 
the representative makes a best judgment about a policy’s merits and in the virtual 
representation model, the representative advocates for supra-territorial interests 
such as a political parties, classes, or organizations. District composition matters 
little for the trustee or virtual models, but potentially a great deal in the delegate 
case. It is easier for representatives to advocate for constituents who have widely 
shared attributes and a greater sense of kinship. 
On the voter side, COIs can facilitate grassroots electoral coordination and 
encourage higher levels of civic involvement and participation when they coincide 
with local networks.17 Whatever the advantages of COI, it is important to realize 
that it is linked to a particular form of democratic representation (i.e., the 
representative as delegate), not to a core democratic concept. For this reason, it is 
more appropriately a matter for state regulation, not constitutional doctrine. 
Apart from its intrinsic merits, the community of interest approach also 
indirectly limits line drawers’ discretion to skew the lines in favor of particular 
groups, incumbents, or parties. Limiting options to those with plausible COI 
rationale, some believe, is the best way to achieve a fair redistricting plan, or at 
 
15. Legislature v. Reinecke, 516 P.2d 6, 16 (Cal. 1973). 
16. In distinguishing his terminology of territorial community from COI, Stephanopoulos 
states: 
I [prefer] the term “territorial community” instead of the more common “community of 
interest” because of certain connotations that the latter phrase has acquired. For one thing, 
a community of interest does not have to be spatially bounded, meaning that it coexists 
uneasily with the American system of geographic districting. In addition, a community of 
interest can be deemed to arise on the basis of any common concern, making the term 
notably imprecise and malleable. With its strong geographic valence and emphasis on the 
full array of interests and affiliations that people share, the concept of a territorial 
community seems substantially more determinate. 
Stephanopoulos, Redistricting and the Territorial Community, supra note 8, at 1431–32 (footnote omitted). 
 The term Stephanopoulos uses, “territorial community,” really refers to the technique of factor 
analyzing census and other data to determine COI clusters. As such, it is one specific way of 
attempting to determine COI. 
17. See Stephanopoulos, Communities and the California Commission, supra note 8, at 288. 
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least, one that minimizes bias significantly.18 In its dual functionality, COI is like 
other formal criteria such as compactness and respect for city or county lines. 
Since any one of the formal criteria, including COI, can be manipulated under 
certain circumstances for party or group benefit, the reform trend has been to 
layer as many formal constraints on the process as possible. However, the more 
redistricting criteria in play, the more important the trade-off between conflicting 
criteria becomes. A sensible answer, adopted in California, is to provide a listing in 
order of priority.19 It is unclear whether all the supporters of Propositions 11 and 
20 that created the CRC understood the implications of ordering criteria, as some 
CRC proponents who wanted more “electoral competition” were apparently later 
dismayed at the attention paid to COI testimony. 
B. The Emergence of Independent Redistricting Commissions 
While the COI concept is not novel, the emergence of independent 
redistricting commissions has given it more prominence. IRCs are the culmination 
of a reform effort aimed initially at reducing, and more recently at eliminating, the 
conflicts of interest that incumbent legislators have when drawing district 
boundaries for themselves.20 Commissions vary in their degree of separation from 
incumbent legislators and other political officials, but independent citizen 
commissions define the far end of the degree of separation continuum.21 
IRCs in general are primarily defined by what they are not—entities 
controlled by incumbents and politicians—as opposed to what they are supposed 
to be. The ambiguity of their role gives rise to different possible interpretations. 
One interpretation is that citizen commissioners should act as neutral decision 
makers, much as the courts do when they are forced to devise plans as the 
redistricting agent of last resort. Courts and court masters do not take extensive 
testimony or rely on public definitions of COI. This conception of the impartial 
arbiter suggests that the citizen commissioner adheres strictly to constitutional and 
statutory guidelines and balances redistricting criteria trade-offs in a neutral, 
evenhanded fashion behind the judicial veil of above-the-fray legitimacy. The 
legitimacy of this approach hinges on all parties buying into the belief that legal 
and professional norms of impartiality will ultimately prevail. In practice, the 
losers in judicially imposed redistricting plans often read bias into the final 
outcomes.22 
 
18. Morrill, supra note 12, at 248. 
19. See CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(d)(1)–2(d)(6). 
20. Cain, supra note 4, at 1826–27. 
21. Id. at 1818, 1844. 
22. Nathaniel Persily notes: 
Rarely will everyone involved in redistricting litigation agree that a court-drawn plan is 
“fair.” By looking at the partisan data while constructing its plan, however, a court might 
be better able to avoid the accusation that its plan is severely biased (in its effects, if not its 
intent) against one of the parties. 
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Another less frequently practiced variant of the impartiality model is the 
neutral tie breaker23—someone who judges between the merits of competing 
plans submitted to them or who takes public suggestions and transparently melds 
them into a finished map product.24 Here too perceptions matter and losers will 
tend to read partisan intent into unfavorable outcomes. 
The Arizona and California IRCs however are more amalgamations rather 
than exemplars of any one decision-making model. On the one hand, 
commissioners were vetted closely (especially in California) for conflict of interest 
problems and excessive partisanship, but at the same time there was a conscious 
effort to pick commissioners who reflected the state as a whole, implying a 
representation model as well. For example, the CRC structure balanced the 
numbers of Democrats, Republicans, and Independents on the Commission and 
put in place voting rules that required bipartisan agreement. Some commission 
advocates hoped that the presence of independents would give the commissions a 
perception of more neutrality, at least between the two parties. While critics in 
both Arizona25 and California26 questioned the partisan neutrality of the 
independent members, for the most part, if not completely neutral, they formed a 
centrist bloc that straddled party lines. 
The public was encouraged in both California and Arizona to submit plans 
for districts or even the entire state, but while the commissioners took public 
suggestions seriously, they developed their own ideas and plans. The effects of 
submitted statewide plans were primarily indirect. The basic architecture was 
developed at the CRC and staff end, but other proposals framed the discussion of 
what was possible, particularly submissions by the civil rights groups (due to the 
threat of potential litigation). Most of the testimony the CRC received initially 
were comments about local COIs, and then later reactions to specific lines 
proposed and posted online for public viewing. 
C. Public Testimony 
Determining COI through public testimony can be expensive and raises 
questions about selectivity bias. The CRC set up meetings throughout the state to 
hear testimony on what people in different parts of the state thought were the 
geographic communities that needed to be kept together (i.e., not divided by a 
district boundary) and which surrounding areas had the most common interests.27 
 
Nathaniel Persily, When Judges Carve Democracies: A Primer on Court-Drawn Redistricting Plans, 73 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1131, 1164 (2005). 
23. This is the model used in New Jersey’s politician commission system. Mark J. Magyar, 
Redistricting Reform in New Jersey 1 (Friends of Local Gov’t Policy Paper Series Vol. 3 No.4, 2011), 
available at http://www.njlmef.org/policy-papers/FoLG_v3_4_Magyar.pdf. 
24. Id. 
25. Cain, supra note 4, at 1831–32. 
26. Id. at 1826–27. 
27. Stephanopoulos, Communities and the California Commission, supra note 8, at 288–89.  
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It is no small logistical matter to transport staff and commission members around 
a large state, advertise widely, do outreach to groups and individuals who might 
otherwise be under-represented, and then collect and post the material with a 
short turnaround time. It is far cheaper to draw lines behind closed doors with 
minimal public input. 
A common criticism of public testimony is the danger of selectivity bias. 
Studies of public testimony generally suggest that the people who show up to 
observe and testify at public hearings can be a biased sample of the total 
population.28 Inevitably, redistricting hearings attract some types of constituents 
more than others. It is a relatively technical subject that precludes many citizens 
from participating. Well-organized neighborhoods, civil rights lawyers, and local 
political officials will have more knowledge and interest in the proceedings than 
the average citizen. Outreach and publicity can improve awareness, but, in the 
end, redistricting tends to appeal to the political hard core. It was alleged in 
California that the testimony was biased further by an organized attempt to recruit 
local activists and party officials to testify before the Commission.29 
Whether that was true, it is fair to say that commissioners have to weigh the 
source of the information they receive as they evaluate the merits of a particular 
COI claim. 
The objective position argues that COIs can best be determined by looking 
for clusters of census indicators or other data. The most prominent proponent of 
this view in recent years is Professor Nicholas Stephanopoulos who in a trilogy of 
articles proposes a territorial communities method: 
[E]lectoral districts should be required to correspond to underlying 
territorial communities. To the extent possible, the boundaries of districts 
and organic geographic communities should be required to coincide—
and the courts should be prepared to intervene when communities are 
unnecessarily fused, fragmented, or subverted, and the state can offer no 
reasonable explanation for the communal disruption.30 
The allure of an objective COI approach is clear. The time and money spent 
on gathering citizen testimony could be avoided if COIs can be determined by 
statistical procedures. Is this hope realistic? 
D. Methods of Data Analysis 
The method of territorial community relies on a statistical procedure called 
factor analysis—a statistical algorithm that identifies clusters of data indicators 
that are assumed to be generated by underlying unmeasured variables—in this 
 
28. See, for instance, Kevin M. Leyden, Interest Group Testimony and Resources at Congressional 
Hearings, 20 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 431, 435–37 (1995), for evidence that groups with resources tend to 
appear more often at public hearings. 
29. See Pierce & Larson, supra note 7. 
30. Stephanopoulos, Redistricting and the Territorial Community, supra note 8, at 1384–85. 
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case, territorial communities.31 For his study of California, Professor 
Stephanopoulos uses both the Census Bureau’s American Community Survey 
(ACS) and a second data set of votes on statewide popular initiative measures.32 
With the ACS data, he found that “the factor with the greatest explanatory power 
is a joint measure of socioeconomic status and Hispanic ethnicity” that 
distinguished tracts of “wealthy, well-educated, white professionals” from tracts 
with “poorer, less educated Hispanics working in blue-collar fields.”33 The other 
factors, in order, were marital status, race, sprawl, and age.34 With the initiative 
data, the factors he discovered were fiscal policy preferences, socio-cultural issues, 
and Native American gaming. Stephanopoulos defines his measure of district 
homogeneity as the standard deviation of the census tracts’ scores weighted by the 
variance explained by each factor.35 
The basic intuition of this territorial communities approach can be described 
simply. COIs are clusters of objective indicators. Good districts are composed of 
similar census tracts as identified by the factor measures (i.e., deviate the least in 
their scores). The greater the homogeneity of various tracts in a district, the better 
the redistricting design. The territorial community vision of representation is first-
order homogeneity offset by second-order heterogeneity: demographically similar 
people are grouped together into districts but with wide variation across districts 
in the types of interests represented.36 In general, there is nothing wrong with this 
view of representation. However, the relevant question is not its legitimacy but 
whether it should be mandated as the baseline standard by state or federal courts. 
In terms of its inherent merits, homogeneous districts are not clearly 
superior or intrinsically more democratic than heterogeneous districts. Indeed this 
question parallels the issues of perspective in the at large versus single member 
district system debate. The U.S. Progressive movement in the early twentieth 
century moved to at large districts to weaken neighborhood parochialism and 
machine politics and to incentivize a jurisdiction wide perspective. Mandating or 
even legally prioritizing homogeneous districts would preclude any future efforts 
to balance parochial area with jurisdiction-wide perspectives. Proponents of more 
competition in U.S. politics would also lose a potential tool. While competitive 
seats can be socioeconomically homogeneous, it is more common to make a seat 
competitive by blending different types of constituents. If a territorial community 
approach were adopted as a judicial standard, it would preclude other equally valid 
approaches to electoral design. 
 
31. See HARRY H. HARMAN, MODERN FACTOR ANALYSIS 3–6 (3d rev. ed. 1976). 
32. Stephanopoulos, Communities and the California Commission, supra note 8, at 289–90. This 
violates the CRC pledge to ignore political data. Pierce & Larson, supra note 7. 
33. Stephanopoulos, Communities and the California Commission, supra note 8, at 291. 
34. Id. at 290. 
35. Id. at 291. 
36. Id. at 283, 289–93. 
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In addition, just because people share census attributes does not mean they 
perceive political commonality. Political agendas can shift rapidly between 
elections or slowly over time from economic issues to social issues: being a 
homeowner might be more important in one election, but being a Catholic may 
matter in another. Census data are not collected for the purpose of tracking 
current policy concerns. Imputing political importance to variables chosen for the 
purpose of demographic accounting can be misleading, which is perhaps why 
Stephanopoulos experimented with his initiative data.37 Still, there is no escaping 
the selection bias problem. The initiative data set is likely skewed towards issues 
that could not be resolved in the legislature or that were able to attract enough 
resources to qualify for the ballot. Implying political identity from objective data is 
problematic unless the real goal is not better representation per se but to prevent 
gerrymandering. 
So perhaps the real purpose is gerrymander prevention. That is to say, the 
real justification of this approach might be to lock in a district building 
methodology that makes intentional bias more difficult. But is the territorial 
community method easier to use, less vulnerable to potential manipulation and 
more likely to produce “fair results”? Stephanopoulos cites evidence that suggests 
this might be so, but since none of these studies used his territorial community 
method and traditional COI criteria are often used in conjunction with other 
formal criteria, it is hard to say for sure.38 In our experience, there is no foolproof 
way to eliminate bias and manipulation. Some formal redistricting criteria are 
better for certain groups than others. Compactness rewards ghettoized groups 
more than dispersed ones. City and county lines help local government officials 
who want to move up the electoral pecking order. Communities of interest sorted 
on income and race might be more protective of Hispanics than some Asian 
groups. 
Skillful line drawers can operate effectively within formal constraints to 
achieve their goals even if some options are taken off the table by the existence of 
formal constraints. When Karcher v. Daggett ushered in the norm of zero population 
deviation congressional districts,39 the effect on partisan and racial bias was 
minimal.40 Similarly, compact lines and respect for local jurisdiction lines do not 
eliminate biases and differential effects completely. Bear in mind that these other 
formal criteria are more simply measured than territorial communities. Technical 
complexity can open the door to more manipulation. Factor scores can be 
weighted differently or computed using different combinations of variables. State 
or regional scores might vary from national ones. Similarity scores in general 
 
37. Id. at 283, 290–91. 
38. Stephanopoulos, Redistricting and the Territorial Community, supra note 8, at 1422, 1444–46. 
39. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 765 (1983). 
40. Burt Neuborne, Felix Frankfurter’s Revenge: An Accidental Democracy Built by Judges, 35 N.Y.U. 
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 602, 629–31 (2011). 
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suffer from scale discrepancies: similarities that appear at one measurement level 
can differ from those at another.41 
In the end, for all these reasons, objective COI approaches such as the 
territorial community method are at best supplements to public testimony, 
certainly not a substitute. There is a tendency in the redistricting field to fetishize 
measures. Given the many criteria that apply to redistricting, the line-drawing 
process is inevitably a balancing act between competing values and criteria. 
Measures such as seat-vote curves, compactness scores, city and county split 
reports, or even objective COI scores can be useful tools for monitoring the 
effects that different options produce. The problem arises when measures are 
turned into standards. The temptation is to think that any one measure can be the 
ultimate standard of fairness that encompasses all the other concerns. The reality 
is the trade-offs have to be decided at some point: early if the criteria are ordered 
by law or later if done by bargaining among members of a redistricting entity. 
E. The American Community Survey Used as Redistricting Data 
Leaving aside for the moment the question of Stephanopoulos’s specific 
territorial method, there is the equally important question of the data that the 
CRC, or indeed any citizen commission, could have used to prepare itself for 
drawing district boundaries in 2011. The ACS was ostensibly a logical choice, but 
closer examination reveals several problems with using ACS data for redistricting 
purposes such as incompatible units of analysis, outdated data, and limited 
variable availability. We begin with a little background about the ACS. 
After the census of 2000 finished its data collection, the long form that had 
been sent out to one out of every six households was discontinued, and questions 
that had previously been asked on that form were moved to a new instrument: the 
American Community Survey, or ACS.42 Data collected by the ACS include social, 
economic, housing, and demographic variables.43 The ACS was fully implemented 
in 2005 and now employs a rolling sample of about 2.9 million households per 
year, as compared to the once per decade sample that received the census long 
form.44 
The general idea of moving from the long form to the ACS was well received 
by the census data user community. Now rather than a once per decade data 
 
41. See S. Openshaw, Ecological Fallacies and the Analysis of Areal Census Data, 16 ENVIRONMEN-
TAL AND PLANNING A 17 (1984). 
42. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, A COMPASS FOR UNDERSTANDING AND USING AMERICAN 
COMMUNITY SURVEY DATA: WHAT GENERAL USERS NEED TO KNOW 1 (2008), available at 
http://www.census.gov/acs/www/Downloads/handbooks/ACSGeneralHandbook.pdf. 
43. Id. 
44. Initial Addresses and Sample Selected and Final Interviews, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AM. CMTY. 
SURVEY, http://www.census.gov/acs/www/methodology/sample_size_data (last visited May 30, 
2013). Between 2000 and 2004, the annual sample size was considerably smaller with 742,209–
890,698 housing units selected. Id. 
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collection effort that would result in quickly outdated data, especially toward the 
end of the decade, the ACS would be able to release updated and more current 
data sets annually prior to the release of the next scheduled census of 2010.45 In 
theory, this would give the line-drawing community a forewarning of what they 
would be facing when the PL94-171 data were finally released, initiating the start 
of redistricting activities. 
The redistricting community looked at this data collection policy change with 
skeptical curiosity; the Census Bureau had never before been able to produce any 
data other than population and racial counts in time for line drawing,46 but with 
the shifts in legal doctrine that seemingly discouraged the exclusive reliance on 
race and ethnicity,47 there was greater interest than in the past in additional 
nonracial data that could be used to guide the construction of districts on all 
levels. Skepticism increased when the census bureau posted the ACS units of 
analysis and the data ranges that would be released in time for redistricting. 
Line drawing for most jurisdictions begins as soon as the Census Bureau 
releases the PL94-171 short form block level data in the spring of the year ending 
with “one.”48 In the spring of 2011, the only data available from the ACS were the 
2005–2009 five-year tract level sample (and for some variables on the block group 
level as well), a 2007–2009 three-year sample for populations of 20,000 and above, 
and a 2009 one-year sample that was available for populations of 65,000 and 
above.49 The first data set, while reasonably up to date, was problematic with 
respect to geography. The second and third data sets could not be used due to 
their inadequate coverage and large unit of analysis. Leaving aside the challenge of 
describing communities of interest and neighborhoods accurately, the extreme 
accuracy required by the population deviation standards for congressional districts 
necessitates the use of block level data.50 But the smallest unit of analysis on which 
the ACS is released is the block group level, and some variables were available on 
the census tract level only.51 Moreover, because the ACS relies on a rolling sample 
 
45. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 42, at 3–4. 
46. During previous redistricting cycles, only the PL94-171 data were available for line 
drawing. The socioeconomic variables from the long form were typically not released until the year 
ending with “three,” thus making them available for litigation but not for the construction of districts. 
47. See cases cited supra n.1 (beginning with Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993)). The PL94-
171 data, which is the result of the census short form that every household receives in the decennial 
census, only collects total population, voting age, race, ethnicity, and housing units. This dataset is 
used to construct lines. The P.L. 94-171 Summary File and Race and Ethnicity Variables, THE 
REDISTRICTING GRP. AT BERKELEY LAW, http://redistrictinggroup.org/redistricting/data-sources-
and-variables/race-and-ethnicity-variables/the-p-l-94-171-summary-file-and-race-and-ethnicity-
variables (last visited May 30, 2013). 
48. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DESIGNING P.L. 94-171 REDISTRICTING DATA FOR THE YEAR 
2010 CENSUS 6–7 (2004), available at http://www.census.gov/rdo/pdf/DesignPL94-171.pdf. 
49. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 42, at 3 tbl. 2. 
50. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7 (1964). 
51. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 42, at 3, A-2. 
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rather than a 100% count like the short form,52 there are some data suppression 
issues, especially for very small population subgroups. This means in practice that 
for some variables, the data set will show zero population in some tracts and block 
groups when in fact there is population there. 
A second problem with using the ACS in the 2011 California redistricting is 
related to outdated information in the sample. This is best illustrated by the 
Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP) variable, an increasingly crucial piece of 
data for evaluating section 5 and section 2 of the Voting Rights Act compliance.53 
Respondents surveyed in any of the five years of the ACS sample effectively do 
not age in the data set: that is, a person who was seventeen years old when she 
responded in 2005 would still be reported at that age at the time of the data release 
in 2010. This is potentially problematic for relatively younger groups such as 
Latino and Asian populations as their Voting Age Population (VAP) numbers will 
be underestimated by this data set due to the “lack-of-aging” sampling feature.54 
For California, this presented a particular challenge because of the presence 
of Voting Rights Act (VRA) section 2 seats that needed, since Bartlett v. 
Strickland,55 to be drawn with a minimum of fifty percent of the Citizen Voting 
Age Population. But it was also problematic for COI Assessment in 2011 because 
much of the data in the five-year, 2005–2009, dataset were based on information 
that had become outdated by rapidly changing conditions. Consider the fact that 
in 2005, real estate in California was booming, buyers were purchasing properties 
at the top of the market and moving to newly developed suburbs, leaving their 
rentals in urban areas behind. Unemployment figures in mid-June were at 5.4% 
and business, including the technology industry was doing well. But, five years 
later, in June of 2009, California’s unemployment was at 11.5%,56 the foreclosure 
crisis was in full swing making many homeowners renters again, and the economy 
had tanked!57 The underlying assumption of an objective indicator COI approach 
to redistricting is the existence of some level of history and stability during the 
duration of the proposed new district’s term; therefore, in order to be a 
community of interest, there has to be some shared past that will continue into the 
future. There also has to be the presence of common, stable denominators of that 
 
52. Id. at 3. 
53. CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMM’N, FINAL REPORT ON 2011 REDISTRICTING  
14–15 (Aug. 15, 2011), http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/downloads/meeting_handouts_082011/crc 
_20110815_2final_report.pdf. 
54. The problems with the ACS CVAP data are discussed in detail in JORGE CHAPA ET AL., 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN INST. ON LAW AND SOC. POLICY, ESTIMATING CITIZEN 
VOTING AGE POPULATION 5–9 (2011), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Redistricting 
_PolicyBrief4_forWeb.pdf. 
55. Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 1 (2009). 
56. Local Area Unemployment Statistics, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 
http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/lasst06000003 (last visited May 30, 2013). 
57. Foreclosure Activity Increases 81 Percent in 2008, REALTYTRAC (Jan. 15, 2009), http://www 
.realtytrac.com/content/press-releases/foreclosure-activity-increases-81-percent-in-2008-4551. 
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interest that are described accurately at the appropriate geographic unit. The kind 
of volatility California experienced in the period leading up to the 2011 
redistricting made the ACS unusable for that reason and purpose. 
The third ACS issue is the weak correspondence between the ACS variables 
and the way residents perceive and define their COIs and neighborhoods. Using 
ACS variables for COI definition is essentially a top-down approach that 
presumes the definition of a community of interest or neighborhood.58 
Aggregated income or economic data do not necessarily translate into the 
perceived collective interests of a group, community, or neighborhood. Table 1 
contains an analysis of 12,425 records of written input to the Commission and 
shows that none of the most frequently mentioned COI themes59 were found in 
the ACS data.60 
As discussed earlier, Stephanopoulos attempts to remedy the weakness of 
ACS data by supplementing it with voting results on initiative measures.61 
However, California’s Proposition 11 specifically prohibits the use of certain types 
of political data in the definition of communities of interest,62 including 
relationships with political parties. Frequently, voting on initiatives is a proxy for 
party identification in California. For example, voting for Proposition 8, the 
elimination of same-sex marriage initiative, showed that Democrats were more 
likely to be opposed than Republicans63 and that counties with higher Democratic 
voter registration voted in higher numbers against the measure.64 The California 
Citizens Redistricting Commission decided early on to broaden the letter of the 
law and not use any political data unless required for VRA assessment purposes.65 
Clearly, this aspect of Stephanopoulos’s territorial communities method could not 
have been used by this Commission. 
 
58. In redistricting hearings, neighborhoods are sometimes described by residents as identical 
to communities of interest, i.e. they can share the same boundaries. See Stephanopoulos, Communities 
and the California Commission, supra note 8, at 283. 
59. The counts in Table 1 are approximate. They are compiled by counting the terms listed in 
three coded categories: “Economic community of interest,” “Social community of interest,” and 
“Reason for staying together.” There are some duplicates among the categories and the categories 
themselves may not be mutually exclusive. For further explanations of the data used in Table 1, see 
CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMM’N, supra note 53, at 4–5. 
60. For explanations of variables and definitions of terms in the 2009 ACS, see generally, U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, AM. CMTY. SURVEY: SURVEY METHODOLOGY MAIN http://www.census.gov/ 
acs/www/methodology/methodology_main (last visited May 30, 2013). 
61. See supra Part D. 
62. “Communities of interest shall not include relationships with political parties, incumbents, 
or political candidates.” CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(d)(4). 
63. Exit Polls, CNN.COM, http://edition.cnn.com/ELECTION/2008/results/polls/#val 
=CAI01p1 (last modified Nov. 5, 2008, 2:34 PM). 
64. See California Proposition 8: Results, WIKIPEDIA, THE FREE ENCYCLOPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/California_Proposition_8#Results (last visited May 30, 2013) 
(“Republicans were more likely to have supported the measure than were Democrats.”). 
65. See Stephanopoulos, Communities and the California Commission, supra note 8, at 289 n.51. 
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Table 1: Frequency of COI Definitions 
 
Community of Interest Definition Count 
Environmental concerns 495 
Common culture/cultural community 440 
Recreation 251 
Fire danger/services 220 
Ethnic community 164 
High-tech industry 104 
Aerospace industry 97 
Religious community 62 
Air quality 38 
II. ESTABLISHING COMMUNITIES OF INTEREST THROUGH PUBLIC TESTIMONY 
California’s implementation of Propositions 11 and 20 has been called an 
“experiment in participatory democracy,”66 and with thousands of attendees at 
dozens of hearings that the Commission held throughout California, along with 
over 20,000 comments that were submitted in writing and more than 2000 
comments that were provided in person during hearings, this statement seems to 
ring true. But did the CRC in fact pay attention to the public’s requests and 
implement them where possible, or was this an empty exercise? We argue that the 
California Citizens Redistricting Commission did listen to the testimony, evaluate 
it, instruct its consultants to consider it67 when drawing “visualizations,”68 and 
used public input extensively during live-line drawing sessions to make decisions 
on where lines should go. 
The CRC received trainings on redistricting issues from various experts,69 
 
66. CA Redistricting Commission–the New Lottery!, MITCHELL KAPOR FOUND., http://blog.mkf 
.org/2010/02/06/ca-redistricting-commission-the-new-lottery (last visited June 29, 2013). 
67. See In the Matter of Full Commission Business Meeting, CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING 
COMM’N 10 (May 6, 2011), available at http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/downloads/transcripts/201105/ 
transcripts_20110506_sana.pdf [hereinafter Full Commission Business Meeting] (recalling line drawing 
instructions to consultants). 
68. The Commission wanted to make clear to the public that consultants were never drawing 
maps without Commission input. When consultants developed potential district options based on 
Commission direction but not during a public hearing, the resulting plans were called “visualizations,” 
rather than “proposals” or “drafts.” Visualizations: Working Draft, CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING 
COMM’N, http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/visualizations-working-draft.html (last visited June 30, 2013). 
69. Experts included Justin Levitt (Loyola Law School), Ana Henderson (Berkeley Law), Hans 
Johnson (Public Policy Institute of California), and Karin Mac Donald (Statewide Database, UC 
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and the ranked criteria, their interpretation, and their implementation were 
covered from different angles. 
Many of the groups involved in the drafting of Proposition 11, including the 
League of Women Voters and California Common Cause, testified in different 
Commission meetings about the importance of hearing directly from California 
residents about their communities and also urged the Commission not to 
prioritize city and county boundaries over neighborhoods and communities of 
interest.70 There was a grave concern among good government groups that 
criterion four—which lists cities, counties, neighborhoods, and communities of 
interest, and was intended to give the same weight to each—would be 
misinterpreted by the Commission and that the simple-to-implement formal 
jurisdictional boundaries would be prioritized instead. In California, as well as in 
many other states, city and county boundaries in densely populated urban areas 
often become blurred to residents, and frequently there is little distinction between 
those that live on one side of one street that happen to be in a different 
jurisdiction from their neighbors.71 The drafters of Proposition 11 wanted to give 
the Commission the flexibility to acknowledge these situations and preserve 
communities of interests that cut across formal jurisdictional boundaries. Voting 
rights groups such as the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund 
(MALDEF) and the Asian Pacific American Legal Center (APALC) in 
collaboration with the Coalition of Asian Pacific Americans for Fair Redistricting 
(CAPAFR) also urged the Commission repeatedly to pay attention to their 
communities’ testimony, and to weigh it highly against other criteria.72 MALDEF, 
APALC, and CAPAFR were among the groups that conducted outreach and 
training campaigns in the communities they serve.73 While these three groups had 
different strategies and resources for outreach, the message to their communities 
 
Berkeley). See, e.g., Full Commission Business Meeting, supra note 67, at 30; (mentioning that “Ms. 
Macdonald” wanted a whole day with the Commission for training); In the Matter of Full Commission 
Line-Drawing Meeting, Vol. I CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMM’N 40 (June 7, 2011), available at 
http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/downloads/transcripts/201106/transcripts_20110607_sacto_vol1.pdf 
[hereinafter Full Commission Line-Drawing Meeting, Volume I ]. 
70. See, e.g., In the Matter of Commission Public Outreach, CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMM’N 
216 (Feb. 26, 2011), available at http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/downloads/transcripts/201102/ 
commissionpublicoutreach_20110226.pdf. In its testimony at the CRC Public Outreach Hearing on 
February 26, 2011, the League of Conservation Voters asked the CRC to “please consider communi-
ties of people and their common interests, then create districts that represent the best interests of 
those communities, of course. Look beyond the existing city and county boundaries . . . .” Id. 
71. See Appendix Map A. 
72. Press Release, Asian Pacific American Legal Center, Asian American Civil Rights Groups 
Oppose Prop. 11 Redistricting Initiative (Sept. 4, 2008), available at http://www.caasf.org/2008/09/ 
asian-american-civil-rights-groups-oppose-prop-11-redistricting-initiative-joint-press-release. 
73. Latinos Needed to Apply to California’s New Citizens Redistricting Commission, MALDEF, 
http://maldef.org/voting_rights/public_policy/new_citizens_redistricting_commission (last visited 
June 29, 2013). 
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was the same: organize, define your community of interest, and tell the 
Commission about it so it can be taken into consideration.74 
The commissioners discussed the information received during public 
meetings and decided on a plan of action for criterion four,75 based on the logic 
that had been presented by experts and by good government and voting rights 
groups: 
1. While census geography could be used to assess where city and county 
boundaries are located, it did not contain neighborhood or community of interest 
boundaries, thus for those criteria, the CRC would have to find alternative 
geographic data sources.76 
2. Available census variables were of limited use for the assessment of 
communities of interest because those that might be of use were either outdated 
or on a unit of analysis that was too large to make a distinction. There were no 
other data sources available that defined either neighborhoods77 or communities 
of interest for the State of California. 
The Commission members decided to fill in the data gaps by asking 
Californians to provide the missing information by defining their community of 
interest and neighborhood boundaries and submitting them to the CRC for 
consideration.78 To make clear what they needed, the commissioners utilized a 
“community of interest” explanatory handout developed by Berkeley Law’s 
Redistricting Group.79 
Later, the Commission developed its own participation handout
 
that briefly 
explained the criteria and asked public speakers to comment on specific points.80 
 
74. Asians Urged to Apply for Redistricting Commission, NEW AM. MEDIA, http://newamerica 
media.org/2010/02/asians-urged-to-apply-for-redistricting-commission.php (last visited June 29, 
2013). 
75. “The geographic integrity of any city, county, city and county, local neighborhood, or local 
community of interest shall be respected in a manner that minimizes their division to the extent 
possible without violating the requirements of any of the preceding subdivisions.” CAL. CONST. 
art. XXI, § 2(d)(4). 
76. Full Commission Business Meeting, supra note 67, at 10–11. 
77. The CRC attempted to collect “official” neighborhood boundaries for jurisdictions where 
such boundaries were available, including Los Angeles and San Francisco. These boundaries were 
heavily debated and modified during line drawing. For San Francisco, for example, different sets of 
official boundaries were located from different city departments and a decision had to be made about 
which ones to adopt. Changes to the adopted boundaries were made based on public input. See In the 
Matter of Commission Public Outreach, CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMM’N 52 (Feb. 26, 2011), 
http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/downloads/transcripts/201102/commissionpublicoutreach_20110226.
pdf (transcribing Steven A. Ochoa’s comments on the need for “maps and descriptive written 
information” in line drawing). 
78. Full Commission Business Meeting, supra note 67, at 26. 
79. See California Redistricting Criterion: Communities of Interest (COI), THE REDISTRICTING GRP. 
AT BERKELEY LAW, http://redistrictinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Communities-of 
-Interest_2pagehandout_byTRGBL.pdf. 
80. The Commission’s worksheet had space for speakers to fill in the criteria that defined their 
communities of interest. See CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMM’N, PUBLIC INPUT HEARINGS, 
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Commissioners also gave verbal explanations at the beginning of the initial set of 
public input hearings to make sure that participants’ testimony would render 
usable information.81 Both the handouts and the verbal explanations made it clear 
that the Commission wanted to know (a) geographic boundaries for the 
neighborhood or community of interest; (b) the community’s interests, (i.e., 
variables that defined it within the law); and (c) why it should be kept together 
(i.e., relevance of the community of interest for the redistricting).82 
The CRC received hundreds of verbal descriptions of communities of 
interest and neighborhoods83 and thousands of written submissions with detailed 
descriptions. Many public speakers provided hard copy maps along with their 
testimony that outlined the boundaries in question. Some speakers were the only 
voice for their community while others had organized groups of speakers84 that 
came forward to make similar points. In some meetings, multiple residents from 
adjacent communities that had not communicated beforehand, or even knew each 
other, testified in agreement that their communities were a COI.85 
The Commission’s technical consultant had one team member in each 
meeting who summarized each public comment into a spreadsheet. A numbered 
code was created for every speaker, and supporting information or exhibits that 
were provided by speakers were likewise coded so they could be referenced along 
with the respective testimony. The public hearing database was updated at each 
input hearing and made available to the commissioners in spreadsheet format and 
in PDF format to the public. At the conclusion of the hearings, there were 2365 
comments in the public hearing database, and 1385 of them specifically addressed 
COIs.86 
 
available at http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/downloads/meeting_handouts_062011/learnmore_20110614 
_worksheet.pdf (asking those surveyed questions such as: “What bonds the community?,” “Where is 
your community located?,” and “Why should the community be kept together?”). 
81. Full Commission Business Meeting, supra note 67, at 5. 
82. Id. 
83. For examples of testimony on video transcript, see generally Video Archive: Citizens 
Redistricting Commission Meeting Viewer, CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMMISSION, http://wedraw 
thelines.ca.gov/viewer.html (last modified June 21, 2012). 
84. For video of the meeting in Bakersfield on April 14, 2011, see Video: Apr. 14, 2011, 
Bakersfield, CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMM’N, http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/video-archive 
-april-14-2011.html (showing testimony from multiple members of Asian and Pacific Islander 
organizations associated with CAPAFR regarding the Hmong COI). 
85. See, e.g., Video: June 19, 2011, San Bernardino, CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMM’N, 
http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/video-archive-june-19-2011-san-bernardino.html (containing testimony 
from nine residents of the San Bernardino mountain communities of Crestline, Lake Arrowhead, 
Cedar Pines Park, and Running Springs, explaining that their small communities are a COI based on 
common school district, isolation, fire danger, etc., and requesting that said communities be kept 
together, particularly in the assembly and senate districts). 
86. The Commission also heard from speakers during open forum at their business meetings. 
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Public input was also collected outside of public hearings. The Commission 
accepted written input via e-mail, mail, phone, and a web form on the CRC 
website.87 
E-mailed comments and those that came in through the website were 
immediately forwarded to the commissioners’ e-mail accounts. All submissions 
were also posted to the website, which required the removal of identifying 
information by CRC staff. CRC staff was also tasked with creating unique 
identifiers for each submission so that a separate public input database could be 
constructed by consultants that would allow for coding of comments and 
searching of public input during line-drawing sessions. 
Though there were frequent trainings by the redistricting consultants to 
ensure accuracy, CRC staff continued to struggle with applying the proper codes 
to submissions. CRC staff also had tremendous problems keeping the submissions 
organized and getting them to the consultants in a timely manner or at all. 
Consultants had to sift through dozens of folders that contained duplicate 
submissions, had the wrong file names attached, and were not properly redacted. 
Three separate quality control processes by consultants to randomly check the 
public input sent to them for coding against what was posted on the website 
showed discrepancies. The effort to clean up the public input data set and make it 
usable for the Commission took tremendous effort by the entire consulting team, 
but, even so, there were still shortcomings. 
While the Commission officially reports receiving over 20,000 written 
comments,88 the public input database we used for the statistics in this Article only 
has 12,425 records. Some of this discrepancy arises from the decision the CRC 
made to not have public comments coded after a certain date,89 because the 
backlog was too high and because redacting, naming, and coding could not have 
been completed during the time the Commission had to construct its final maps. 
In the days before the Commission finalized the maps, there were up to 500 
written submissions received daily by CRC staff. The commissioners nevertheless 
decided to read all submissions after the coding cut-off date in order to be able to 
take that input into consideration. It is also likely that Commission staff counted 
many duplicate submissions, which then factored into the total,90 and possibly also 
 
87. See Contact Page, CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMM’N, http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/ 
contact.html (last visited May 30, 2013). 
88. For a summary of input collected, see CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMM’N, FINAL 
REPORT ON 2011 REDISTRICTING 5 (Aug. 15, 2011), http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/downloads/ 
meeting_handouts_082011/crc_20110815_2final_report.pdf. 
89. Input received by July 25 was coded and is part of the dataset analyzed. 
90. For an example of duplicated records, see Public Comments: May 2011, CAL. CITIZENS 
REDISTRICTING COMM’N, http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/public-comments-may-2011.html (last 
modified May 31, 2011) (containing two links to comments by user “Distasio”); see also Kathleen P. 
Distasio, Public Comment to CRC–May 20th, 2011 Santa Rosa, CA, CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING 
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counted public input by speakers during hearings if it was accompanied by a 
written transcript of their testimony, as separate written public input. 
A preliminary analysis of the 12,425 records analyzed shows that 7138 
specifically address communities of interest. Many more imply COI but are not 
explicit. At least 4237 comments outlined economic COI and a minimum of 1792 
addressed social COI.91 
A. Where Testimony Mattered 
Community of interest testimony affected the lines for all district types 
throughout California. The Commission took a district-by-district approach in 
creating its plans. For each district, commissioners would debate the testimony 
they had received and then build the district while complying with higher ranked 
criteria.92 We can broadly classify the types of instances in which COI testimony 
mattered into several categories: affinities between neighboring communities, 
related population growth outside the boundaries of an incorporated city, 
discrepancies between neighborhoods and census designations, and interests not 
covered by data like ACS. 
The first category, affinities between neighboring communities, is well 
illustrated by testimony received at the CRC’s Santa Rosa hearing, which revealed 
that Marin County residents in large numbers did not want to share a district with 
San Francisco.93 The summary of the public hearing comments reads: “Many 
Marin residents would like Marin County to be in a district with Sonoma County 
and include Santa Rosa if possible. . . .”94 There were many written submissions 
that made the same points.95 At subsequent hearings, speakers commented on the 
 
COMM’N (May 22, 2011, 4:12 PM), available at http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/downloads/public 
-comments-201105/public_comment_8marin_20110522_distasio.pdf. 
91. This dataset has not been cleaned. Coding asked for a box to be checked for social or 
economic COI mentioned, but this was not always done. The actual numbers are likely much higher. 
92. CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMMISSION, supra note 88, at 7–25. 
93. For video transcript of the Santa Rosa hearing, see, Video Archive: May 20, 2011, Santa Rosa, 
CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMM’N, http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/video-archive-may-20 
-2011-santa-rosa.html. 
94. For a summary of public comments and a regional “wrap-up” document, see generally 
Region VII, VIII Wrap-up, CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMM’N 2 (May 26, 2011), available at 
http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/downloads/meeting_handouts_may2011/handouts_20110527_q2_7_8 
.pdf. 
95. See, e.g., Joan Caviness, Public Comment on Redistricting of the North Bay, CAL. CITIZENS 
REDISTRICTING COMM’N (May 21, 2011, 11:04 PM), available at http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/ 
downloads/public-comments-201105/public_comment_8marin_20110521_caviness.pdf; Distasio, 
supra note 90; Kathleen Doyle & Charles Kiene, Public Comment on Proposition 20, CAL. CITIZENS 
REDISTRICTING COMM’N (May 22, 2011), available at http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/downloads/ 
public-comments-201105/public_comment_8marin_20110522_joint.pdf; Comment from Wendy 
Friefeld, Public Comment on Redistricting–Marin and Sonoma Counties, CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING 
COMM’N (May 22, 2011, 9:56 PM), available at http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/downloads/public-
comments-201105/public_comment_8marin_20110522_friefeld.pdf; Nancy & Carleton Prince, Public 
Comment on Marin and Sonoma Counties, CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMM’N (May 22, 2011 6:06 
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rural similarities of the areas, including the presence of dairy farming industries.96 
In their numerous written submissions, Marin residents suggested that the area’s 
rural and suburban character fostered a family- and outdoor-oriented lifestyle that 
shared similar concerns about watersheds and the 101 freeway.97 There was also 
written testimony about the similarities of the small cities of Petaluma and 
Cotati.98 
The resulting assembly district is described by the Commission as follows in 
its final report: 
AD 10 consists of the entire county of Marin and extends north to 
include communities in southern Sonoma County including part of Santa 
Rosa to achieve population equality. It keeps whole the sister cities of 
Petaluma, Cotati, and Sebastopol. This district is characterized by 
suburban and rural areas including a significant dairy industry.99 
Another area in which COI testimony proved influential was in identifying 
spillover population that is located outside the boundaries of a city or county but 
shares a common interest with that jurisdiction. A good illustration of this is the 
population that surrounds the city of Santa Clarita. Map 1 shows population 
density in blue dots in and around Santa Clarita. 
 
  
 
PM), available at http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/downloads/public-comments-201105/public_comment 
_8marin_20110522_prince.pdf; Barbara Raeuberto, Redistricting Comments, CAL. CITIZENS 
REDISTRICTING COMM’N (May 22, 2011, 1:43 PM), available at http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/ 
downloads/public-comments-201105/public_comment_8marin_20110522_raeuber.pdf. 
96. See, e.g., Video: Feed One from June 27, 2011 Public Input Hearing, CAL. CITIZENS REDIS-
TRICTING COMM’N, http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/video-archive-june-27-2011-san-francisco.html. 
97. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
98. See Heidi Rhymes, Public Comment: Redistricting for Petaluma, CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING 
COMM’N (May 22, 2011 6:20 PM), available at http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/downloads/public-
comments-201105/public_comment_8sonoma_20110522_rhymes.pdf (“Petaluma is far more a part 
of [Sonoma County] than of Marin . . . . ”). 
99. CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMM’N, supra note 88, at 29–30. 
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Map 1: Population Density in Santa Clarita and Surrounding Area 
 
The city had a significant population density surrounding its official 
boundary, most notably along its northern and southeastern boundaries. At the 
Antelope Valley and San Fernando hearings, the Commission received testimony 
from Santa Clarita residents requesting the inclusion of these areas within a district 
with Santa Clarita. They testified that these unincorporated county residents 
attend the same schools, work and go to church in similar places, and shop in 
Santa Clarita. Moreover, they said it was very likely that the city would annex these 
areas in the near future. Testimony also indicated that there were new housing 
developments planned in unincorporated county adjacent to the city. 
Another aspect of COI testimony is ascertaining where neighborhoods differ 
from census units. Clearly, if a neighborhood does not follow block group or tract 
lines, the census unit based information from the ACS will be mismatched with 
COI perceptions. Such was clearly the case in San Francisco, as shown in Map 2. 
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Map 2: Census Units and Neighborhood Divisions in San Francisco 
 
Neighborhoods matter a lot in San Francisco’s politics at almost every level. 
But at least forty-nine of San Francisco’s 176 census tracts are split by the city’s 
neighborhoods. Once again, a statistical procedure aggregating areas based on 
census tracts would not be able to capture those neighborhood units. 
Finally, there are parts of California where the socioeconomic profile is 
either irrelevant or so invariant that ACS information is basically unhelpful. Map 3 
shows the Hollywood-Beverly Hills and southern San Fernando Valley (Tarzana, 
Encino, Sherman Oaks, and Studio City) areas. 
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Map 3: Hollywood-Beverly Hills and Southern San Fernando Valley Areas 
 
Judging from the map it is a consistently well-to-do area. But the CRC 
received overwhelming testimony regarding the distinction between communities 
and their interests in the San Fernando Valley as opposed to the Los Angeles 
Basin communities. The two COIs are geographically delineated by the 
Mulholland grade/Santa Monica Mountains. On the northern side of the grade is 
the San Fernando Valley and on the southern side of the grade is the Los Angeles 
Basin. According to the ACS data, communities on either side of the grade appear 
to be demographically and socially similar, but the testimony received by the 
Commission during their public input process characterized the Mulholland grade 
as the “Great Wall of China” between these Los Angeles regions. Additionally, the 
Commission received compelling testimony regarding the fire hazard in the 
Hollywood Hills on the Los Angeles Basin side of the grade that does not exist on 
the San Fernando Valley side. The fire hazard on the Los Angeles Basin side is 
due to the exposure to seasonal Santa Ana winds and does not exist to the same 
degree on the San Fernando Valley side of the grade. Due to the extensive issues 
around wildfire hazards, fire prevention, and fire services, the communities in the 
Hollywood Hills requested that they not be placed in an “over the hill” district 
with the San Fernando Valley given their need for a representative dedicated to 
assisting them with fire abatement and prevention issues. 
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B. The Compatibility of Communities of Interest and Other Formal Criteria 
As discussed earlier, communities of interest share the fourth criterion in the 
California Constitution with cities, counties, cities and counties, and 
neighborhoods.100 In the Commission’s final report, criterion four is referred to as 
the “geographic integrity” criterion,101 and all entities listed therein (cities, 
counties, COIs, etc.) were ostensibly given the same weight. However, the final 
report makes clear that when these geographic criteria were in conflict, the 
Commission tipped the balance on the side of the COIs.102 
Compactness is the fifth ranked redistricting criterion in the California 
Constitution, below population equality, the VRA, contiguity, and geographic 
integrity of jurisdictions including communities of interest.103 
Compactness is not as easily implemented as it would seem especially when 
the preservation of other geographies, such as city boundaries is a higher ranked 
criterion. Many California cities are anything but compact; they have strange 
shapes, non-city areas within the city, and frequently there are disconnected 
outlying areas that are part of the city, that have to be picked up in line drawing to 
unify the jurisdiction and that render the shape even less compact.104 In early 
hearings, the Commission repeatedly heard from one of its voting rights attorneys 
about the importance of compactness, leaving commissioners with the clear 
impression that he prioritized compactness over the higher ranked criteria.105 He 
linked compactness with contiguity, a higher ranked criterion, and diminished the 
importance of communities of interest.106 A joint group of good-government 
organizations took issue with this view and urged the Commission to apply the 
criteria as they were defined and ranked by the constitution, not its attorneys.107 A 
number of sharply worded letters were submitted to the CRC by groups including 
 
100. CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(d)(4). 
101. See CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMM’N, supra note 88, at 23. 
102. Id. at 24 (“When those same-level criteria were in conflict and could not be 
simultaneously satisfied, the Commission chose the configuration that best reflected the shared 
interests of the community.”). 
103. CAL. CONST. art. XXI § 2(d)(5). 
104. See, for example, the city boundaries of Fresno and Bakersfield. 
105. Full Commission Business Meeting, supra note 67, at 26 (“[ I]f the districts [drawn by the 
CRC] . . . look compact and seem to comply with everything, there’s not going to be much advantage 
to . . . .trying to challenge the districts or hav[ing] a referendum . . . .”); Full Commission Line-Drawing 
Meeting, Volume II: Meeting Before the Cal. Citizens Redistricting Commission, CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICT-
ING COMM’N 52 (June 7, 2011 1:23 PM), available at http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/downloads/ 
transcripts/201106/transcripts_20110607_sacto_vol2.pdf [hereinafter Full Commission Line-Drawing 
Meeting, Volume II ] (“[N]esting is a lower criteria than compactness.”). 
106. For a discussion about how compactness presents an issue for a district that is drawn to 
combine communities of interest, see Full Commission Line-Drawing Meeting, Volume II, supra note 105, 
at 21–22. 
107. For testimony by Cressman about VRA attorneys’ presentation about criteria and VRA 
attorneys’ false ranking of criteria, see Full Commission Line-Drawing Meeting, Volume I, supra note 69, at 
36–37. 
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those that were part of the collaborative coalition that drafted the initiative,108 
urging the Commission to follow the constitution and educating them about the 
VRA attorneys’ misinterpretation of the criteria.109 
After hearing repeatedly from these various groups and speakers about the 
problems with VRA counsel’s guidance regarding the compactness requirement, 
the Commission concluded that the compactness criterion only had to be 
considered if it did not conflict with the higher ranked criteria.110 Satisfying all the 
higher ranked criteria, especially criterion four in light of the voluminous public 
input, was a feat in and of itself; by the time compactness could have been 
considered, the lines were for the most part set in place so that little further 
modification was possible. However, the early guidance by VRA counsel did leave 
its mark on some of the districts in the end. In particular the Anaheim–Santa Ana 
senate district, about which there had been voluminous public testimony about the 
two cities constituting a community of interest.111 The CRC was advised by its 
VRA attorney that it could not combine this community of interest because the 
City of Orange separated the two jurisdictions, and thus the lines would not be 
compact enough to constitute a community of interest.112 In the end, the two 
 
108. Steven Reyes and Kathay Feng (Executive Director of Common Cause California), two 
of the authors of Proposition 11, wrote a letter to the CRC educating the Commission about errors in 
VRA counsel’s presentation and materials regarding criteria ranking and application. Letter from 
Steven Reyes & Kathay Feng, Exec. Dir., Common Cause Cal., to Cal. Citizens Redistricting Comm’n 
4, (June 2, 2011), available at http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/downloads/public-comments-201106/ 
public_comment_20110602_4.pdf (discussing “contiguity” and “compactness”). 
109. A letter by the African American Redistricting Collaborative summarizes the previously 
submitted letters and notes the dates on which they were submitted or read into the public record. 
Letter from Afr. Am. Redistricting Collaborative to Cal. Citizens Redistricting Comm’n 2–3 (July 7, 
2011), available at http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/downloads/meeting_handouts_072011/handouts_ 
20110708_sacto.pdf. Item 5 outlines the concern about the application of compactness with respect 
to the application of the Voting Rights Act. Id. at 3. 
110. See CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMM’N, supra note 88, at 24. 
111. For examples of videotaped testimony, see speakers 10, 12, 18, 27, 31, and 55, among 
others, testifying in Video Archive: May 6, 2011, Santa Ana Feed Six, CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING 
COMM’N, http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/video-archive-may-6-2011-santa-ana.html (testifying about 
keeping Santa Ana and Anaheim together due to their COI). 
112. Interestingly, the same attorney referenced past redistricting by the “Special Masters” 
frequently and held their maps up as an example that the Commission should strive to achieve. The 
Special Masters, however, created a combined Santa Ana and Anaheim district in 1991 by combining 
the two cities through Garden Grove explicitly to maximize the Latino population in the districts. The 
same architecture was maintained in the 2001 districts. For more information on Assembly District 
69, see Report and Recommendations of the Special Masters on Reapportionment, BERKELEY INST. OF 
GOVERNMENTAL STUD. (Dec. 9, 1991), http://igs-web.lscrtest.com/library/research/quickhelp/ 
policy/redistricting/reapp90-report/final-V-A.html. For a district map of Assembly District 69, see 
Map of California Assembly District 69, STATEWIDE DATABASE, http://statewidedatabase.org/info/ 
ad01maps/AD692001.jpg (last visited May 30, 2013). For more information on Senate District 34, see 
Report and Recommendations of the Special Masters on Reapportionment, supra. For a district map of Senate 
District 34, see Map of California Senate District 34, STATEWIDE DATABASE, http://statewidedatabase 
.org/info/sd01maps/SD342001.jpg (last visited May 30, 2013). For information on Congressional 
District 46, see Report and Recommendations of the Special Masters on Reapportionment, supra. For a district 
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areas were combined in a VRA section 2 district for the assembly,113 but they were 
split, for the most part, in the senate district.114 
CONCLUSION 
While we reject the idea that objective indicators, especially those derived 
from the ACS, are an adequate substitute for public testimony and we endorse the 
construction of COIs based on how residents perceive them, we leave open the 
possibility that creative and thoughtful quantitative data collection can supplement 
a redistricting effort. The problem is the time and expense of adding this task to 
the many others already on the shoulders of citizen commissions and their staff. It 
is a massive task to collect and organize the plans, COIs, suggestions, and 
objections the public submits. But if public participation is to mean anything, 
these submissions must be taken seriously. This is by far the most important 
challenge for the next round of citizen redistricting. Perhaps, the collection of 
relevant data can be crowdsourced, or the onus be placed on those who testify to 
present more evidence for their arguments. But we see little or no value in using 
outdated and incomplete census tract data to create so-called territorial 
communities as a substitute for real COIs. 
The temptation to eliminate the political balancing of different interests by 
formula or computational methods does not eliminate the political decision: it 
simply pre-decides it by the assumptions of the measures. And to make any one 
criterion—competitiveness, seat-votes symmetry, or territorial community—the 
primary baseline for drawing lines simply fetishizes useful measures and creates 
arbitrary standards. It does not eliminate political judgment; it imposes it. If that is 
what a community wants to do, then so be it. But it should not be something that 
the courts do to the community in the name of political impartiality. 
 
  
 
map of Congressional District 46, see Map of California State Congressional District 46, STATEWIDE 
DATABASE, http://statewidedatabase.org/info/cd01maps/CD462001.jpg (last visited May 30, 2013). 
113. For a description of Assembly District 69, see CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMM’N, 
supra note 88, at 40. 
114. Id. at 50. 
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Appendix: 
 
Map A: County Boundaries of Contra Costa and Alameda Along the El 
Cerrito (Contra Costa County) and Albany (Alameda County) Borders, City  
and Boundary Lines of Emeryville and Berkeley Along the Oakland Border 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
